June 19, 2014, by Brigitte Nerlich
Kandinsky, New Objectivity, and ripping apart the furniture
This is a post by GREGORY HOLLIN who helped organise the Circling the Square conference and these are his reflections on some of the online discussions that followed on blogs and in comments.
Circles, Squares, and nonrepresentational forms in Munich
Recently I visited Munich and, at the behest of a friend who knows far more about these things than me, spent a morning wandering around the Lenbachhaus art gallery[i]. The top floor of this spectacular building is largely taken up with paintings from the Blue Rider movement, which was active around Munich from around 1910-1914. Perhaps the most famous member of the blue riders was Wassily Kandisky and the Lenbachhaus offers a fantastic array of his work.
As you walk around the rooms of the Lenbachhaus you can see Kandisky’s work change quite remarkably; in the first years of the twentieth century, in paintings such as Der Blaue Reiter (1903), you can clearly make out stylised, yet certainly recognisable, buildings, trains, and – of course – horses. Ten years later, however, when Kandisky was fashioning his ‘impressions’ and ‘abstractions’, the outside world, at least in any recognisable form, completely disappears in a haze of colour. In the words of the Lenbachhaus, Kandisky’s improvisations:
“… offer an especially clear illustration of his personal path to abstraction: to Kandinsky’s mind, abstraction meant a sustained effort to conceal and encode representational content in order to convey spiritual ideas in physical form by unfolding their “inner harmony.””[ii]
Kandisky is not turning away from the outside world here, and the Lenbachhaus note that although these paintings “…appear largely nonrepresentational…they were inspired by impressions of nature outside of him”. The impressions are, nonetheless, undoubtedly harder to read, nonintuitive, and (as the aforementioned friend discovered) can leave the uninitiated impressed but slightly confused.
What was particularly interesting about this gallery, however, was that the Blue Rider movement was, quite deliberately, juxtaposed with paintings from the New Objectivity movement. These paintings could not have been more different. Christian Schad’s Operation (1929) shows appendix surgery in photorealistic detail. Josef Scharl’s The Fallen Solider (1932) brings to mind Otto Dix (another artist associated with this movement) in its stark depiction of death in the trenches during World War 1. Without claiming that I’m offering anything like a definitive, or indeed accurate, reading of these works it seemed to me that these artists, who had grown up and often served during WW1, were saying: ‘it is all well and good to play with these experimental forms, aiming to reach a deep truth or new understanding through nonrepresentation, but The Somme is too important for that. The Somme must be shown in the cold, horrific light of day for the mass slaughter that it was’.
Circling the Square in Nottingham
Shortly after I’d returned from Munich I helped out at the conference we held here in Nottingham entitled Circling the Square[iii]. As anyone who attended that conference (or who has followed the ensuing blogs) will know, there has been a great deal of discussion regarding the types of knowledge, and the forms that knowledge is presented in, in relation to both the natural and social sciences. One strand of this debate has been a strident criticism of social scientific attempts to ‘deconstruct’ the facts of the natural sciences, in particular quantum physics and global warming. To me, much of this criticism strikes a chord with New Objectivity: it is fine for social scientists to warble away when concerning themselves with inconsequential areas of study, but the straightforward, empirical reality of quantum physics cannot be denied (as a contributor to this blog has told me, our microelectronics industry would be in poor shape without it) and global warming, like death in the trenches, should not be denied – the consequences are just too dire for the kind of obscurantism we associate with social scientists (and blue riders…).
In a lovely article[iv], Derek Edwards and colleagues refer to these two arguments, respectively as ‘furniture’ (the reality of which cannot be denied) and ‘death’ (the reality of which should not be denied) arguments against relativism. These types of questions certainly provoke soul-searching among social scientists: should I deconstruct the claims of climate scientists if I believe in this mode of analysis, or does the potential uptake of those arguments by climate sceptics necessitate that I stop? Does my refusal to apply post-structuralist theory to quantum physics demonstrate a laudable restraint or a failure of nerve? Is there space for a blue rider in Verdun?
Of course, I don’t have answers to these questions but, in the hyperbolic fall out of this conference, it’s interesting to see parallels elsewhere. Indeed, I think that is one of the values of social scientific analyses in these areas; these methods and theories might help us think about some of these issues – or ourselves – differently, provide new insights, or perhaps simply provide some pleasure. What is more, it is perhaps worth remembering that, in the Lenbachhaus circa 2014, there remains space for both.
[i] http://www.lenbachhaus.de/index.php?id=10&L=1
[ii] http://www.lenbachhaus.de/collection/the-blue-rider/kandinsky/?L=1
[iii] http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/conference/fac-sci/circling-the-square/index.aspx
[iv] Edwards, D., Ashmore, M. & Potter, J., 1995. Death and Furniture: The rhetoric, politics and theology of bottom line arguments against relativism. History of the Human Sciences, 8(25-49), pp.25–49.
Image: Lenbachhaus Museum, Munich: wikimedia commons
The Death & Furniture article should be accessible to all readers at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v002/2.1ashmore.html
This may be a fair assessment of what’s being said, but I may have put it differently myself. As I see it, if social scientists are going to play rhetorical games about the meaning of words like truth, objectivity, reality, …. then it has the possibility of creating a level of doubt about our scientific understanding that may not be consistent with the actual level of understanding – at least, the level of understanding as seen by physical scientists. Either the laws of physics describe an actual reality and can be used to understand/describe the universe, or we’re wasting our time doing anything.
Great post Greg. This raises the more general question of how reality can be represented in different ways, for example through science or art. Of course, the question then arises if reality can be the same if it is represented in such different ways. Climatologists define climate as the statistics of weather, a poet, musician or painter will have another definition of (weather related) climate. The work of Nelson Goodman is usually cited as pioneering contribution to the question of different forms of representation, as for example in this paper by Anjan Chakravertty.
Can we know what reality is without attempts of representing it? Does it make sense to say social scientists are dealing with inconsequential areas of study whereas quantum physics exemplifies a reality that ‘cannot be denied’? Are not both in the business of representing reality?
Can you please elaborate on what you mean here, or why it’s relevant to a discussion about the relationship between STS specifically and the natural/physical sciences? I can understand a philosopher contemplating the nature of reality. Fascinating and complex concept. However, we’re discussing here (as I understand it) the connection between STS and the natural/physical sciences. If you place yourself at the science/society or science/policy interface, then you’re placing yourself between two groups who assume that reality is what we perceive it to be. Scientists assume that the Sun about which we orbit is a ball of plasma with fusion in its core, not some figment of our imagination. Policy makers assume that the lives that are saved when they introduce mandatory seatbelt use are real lives, not manifestations of our perception of reality. So, I rather fail to see the merits in STS researchers contemplating the nature of reality. As I said above, that would simply seem to introduce a level of uncertainty about science that isn’t consistent with our actual understanding, and it’s unclear why people at the science/policy interface would see this as a remotely sensible strategy to adopt.
Hmmmm …there might be a danger that if one reduces reality (or what Goodman seems to call the ‘target systems in the world’) to representation, it might kick back 😉 And just as an aside, something that has intrigued me for a long time – in German ‘representation’ can be linguistically represented, if you like, by Vorstellung (mental image, idea etc.), Darstellung (pictorial or linguistic representation or symbolisation [see Bernhardi’s Sprachlehre, 1801) etc.) and Vertretung (act of speaking for somebody in parliament or law) – but that’s by the by – just to indicate that ‘representation’ is a very complex concept, especially with relation to ‘reality’. And I wouldn’t say that social scientists deal with inconsequential areas of study. As people have so often pointed out, understanding the complexities of human behaviour is as hard as things can get. What social scientists try to do is certainly not ‘soft’ or inconsequential, I think.
The answer to the question “if reality can be the same if it is represented in such different ways” is obviously: “yes, it can”. Is it the same? It seems likely that there is an underlying reality in the natural world that science aims to provide objective knowledge of and mechanistic insight into, and (modern/modernish) art may attempt to provide subjective and expressive interpretation of. Some examples may be illustrative….. but firstly it’s interesting to point out that Anjan Chakravartty in the piece you link to makes it one of her two key assumptions in developing her theme of representation in science and art that there is an underlying reality that science attempts to interrogate (her assumption is that science involves, or at least aspires to, substantive truths about the world).
Since you raise climate/weather in your general comment we could consider a specific example:
The 4th movement of Beethoven’s pastoral is “Gewitter, Sturm” (aka Thunder and Storm), a musical expression of an experience of a weather event. We recognize the dramatic elements and since we know what the music is expressing we may well have an empathetic response since humans share an ability to conjure emotions, feelings and understanding from artistic representation.
However if the 4th movement of the Pastoral was played in isolation in the apparent context of a different reality (say “anger”) then we might similarly have an empathetic response. It does sound like a musical expression of anger. Would you agree or not? There is a particularly high degree of subjectivity and abstractness in orchestral musical representations.
Scientific representation of a thunder storm (a model, or a paper on the accumulation of atmospheric charge separation as a prelude to a lightning strike, or a textbook description of the local atmospheric conditions conducive to the development of a storm) is of quite a different order. We couldn’t interpret any of these representations as being about “anger”. Moreover the scientific descriptions are objective to the extent (for example) that the descriptions of atmospheric charge separation are independent of the ways that this is measured and the mechanistic insight developed by scientific investigation allows prediction of the development of weather on a local scale rather well (for 3- 4 days after which some elements of the statistical nature of knowledge of weather causes the progressive degradation of predictability!).
Weather and more specifically a storm are realities that can be represented expressively or scientifically, the former engaging the subjective and emotional self, and the latter the objective and mechanistic perspectives that allow prediction and construction of further understanding. Is there any value in considering that these fundamentally different representations don’t interrogate the same reality? Is there a good argument in support of that view?
Thanks for this Greg – love Kandinsky!
Thinking about weather, Turner went on a similar journey to Kandinsky in some ways. From this: http://www.artfund.org/assets/what-to-see/exhibitions/2013/Turner%20and%20the%20Sea/The-Shipwreck-1536LS.jpg
To this: http://www.apollo-magazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Turner-1024×684.jpg
Does one or the other represent reality better?
I love Kandinsky too!! I still remember going to an exhibition in Duesseldorf in 1978! And I have one (print) hanging in my living room!
“As I see it, if social scientists are going to play rhetorical games about the meaning of words like truth, objectivity, reality, …. then it has the possibility of creating a level of doubt about our scientific understanding that may not be consistent with the actual level of understanding – at least, the level of understanding as seen by physical scientists.”
Hi ATTP,
I’m sorry I haven’t more time to enter into this today (and am away until Wednesday, so apologies), but one of the reasons that I like the metaphor with Kandinsky is that I think it’s pretty hard to claim that his impressions of nature are ‘rhetorical games’ aimed at promoting uncertainty. Surely Kandinsky’s work is productive, not destructive, with the aim of contributing to knowledges rather than destroying them? This isn’t ‘chronic ambivilation’, as Steve Fuller claimed of STS, but something else entirely and I think it’s important to acknowledge that aspect of social scientific work concerning the natural sciences.
I really don’t see uncertainty as lying at the centre of my work (and would just about claim to be in STS, although moving towards the history and philosophy of science wing) and felt it worthwhile to note that in this post (which is not to say that consequences cannot arise, as the new objectivists would note).
Apologies I can’t make a fuller contribution to the other points at the moment,
Greg
Greg and Warren..
we’re talking about two different things here surely. Kandinsky (and Turner) were exploring at a personal level (although Kandinsky was at various levels part of a modernist movement) pictorial representation that involves the subjective, personal and emotional experience with respect to their subject. In fact a strong element of Kandinsky’s philosophy was to emphasise and embrace the subjective nature of experience.
In suggesting that there are meaningful parallels with the nature of scientific knowledge one is really pushing connections where I would say there are only contrasts. Obviously Kandinsky’s impressions of nature weren’t “rhetorical games”, and I’m surprised you take that meaning from ATTP’s post, since ATTP was clearly referring to something quite different (aka the “rhetorical games” that insinuates an ambivalence in the nature of scientific knowledge that in most specific cases we might look at likely doesn’t exist). To misinterpret ATTP’s post sounds a little like a “rhetorical flourish” on Greg’s part!
It doesn’t seem helpful or meaningful to suggest some broad continuum or even significant analogies between representation of knowledge in science and in representation of experience in art even if some loose parallels exist. Art certainly since the late 19th century (Turner was something of a fore-runner) is in a major way concerned with the subjective nature of experience, even if we might consider that a work of art may convey a more realistic interpretation of experience since it engages the emotional self which is a major part of our personal reality.
Science is about acquisition of useful explanatory knowledge much of that knowledge being objective by any real world meaning of the term. We could discuss this of course.
As for “deconstruct”ing the “claims of climate scientists” one might firstly ask “why and to what end?” and secondly: “wouldn’t it be rather more useful with respect to the apparent and contrived conflicts in relation to communicating science to the public (“science communication anyone??) to deconstruct the claims of “climate skeptics”?” It’s surprising that the latter doesn’t seem a worthy subject by social scientists by and large, and yet it could be hugely fruitful with respect to public understanding. Of course one would have to understand something about the nature of the scientific evidence, and this might be difficult to deal with from a perspective that scientific knowledge is highly subjective and perhaps somewhat akin to art in relation to its representational basis.
I took the point to be, the way the artists moved from a more objective depiction to a more interpretive one (of course, an artist may travel in the opposite direction – David Foster Wallace did this in his books). I would agree that there probably isn’t a continuum between Kandinsky and science. However, I think they would both constitute ‘truth’ to certain people.
As an aside, one way out of the apparent impasse about objectivity etc is to return to Aristotle, who identified three types of knowledge, or more accurately ‘intellectual virtues’
Phronesis – practical wisdom
Techne – technical know-how
Episteme – universal truth
So again, there are different types of knowledge available, which abide by different criteria and may be more applicable at different points in space and time.
Re deconstructing facts, I think this term has come to foster some misunderstanding. A better way of expressing it might be to analyse where established scientific facts (by which I mean, knowledge which has come to be widely accepted) have come into being. Edwards’s A Vast Machine is probably the best example for climate change. Whether or not this kind of work has a positive or negative effect on one’s view of science probably depends on the reader, and the type of science that is the subject. If the science is robust, then presumably there should not be much to fear.
Finally, I’d argue that there is quite a significant body of literature which seeks to deconstruct climate sceptic claims: Oreskes and Conway, Dunlap etc
They’re fundamentally different types of “truth” ‘though. To suggest that these truths (scientific knowledge and artistic experiential representation) are equivalent is to engender a semantic confusion. Who are these “certain people” btw!?
I’m not convinced there is a real impasse about objectivity. To my mind any confusion arises from attempts to define “objectivity” in some broad academic or philosophical manner. The nature of scientific objectivity can be understood quite well I think by recourse to specific examples… we could probably come up with a definition of “objectivity” as it relates to scientific knowledge. Or at least we could come up with an operational definition that helps us to understand the workings of science and the acquisition of scientific knowledge in the real world.
Yes you’re right that there is some deconstruction of climate skeptic claims in the literature – I should have thought of Oreskes at least.
I think it might be important in this context to distinguish between deconstruction (or a strategy of critical analysis associated with the French philosopher Jacques Derrida [1930–2004], directed towards exposing unquestioned metaphysical assumptions and internal contradictions in philosophical and literary language) and deconstruction as a quasi-synonym for analysis (or, at least etymologically, the act of resolving [something] into its elements). (See OED) The two can go together of course, but people who don’t speak the language of post-modernism might not know.
Hi Chris,
It certainly wasn’t intended as a rhetorical flourish, so apologies if that is how it seemed. I completely agree with you that Kandisky was not playing rhetorical games (and I don’t attribute that position to ATTP). Indeed I explicitly note this in my post. My suggestion was that the majority of STS scholars are not engaging in games wherein uncertainty is the primary currency either (contrary to ATTP’s assertion) and thus the metaphor (whilst fully accepting that it is just that) is more meaningful, at least on this level, than you’re suggesting.
Greg
Hi Greg,
Thanks for the reply, but I don’t think I’m asserting anything (and I think that should have been obvious from what I wrote). I’m really trying to understand something here and trying to present my impression of what I’ve seen (which isn’t particularly extensive, to be fair). I’m hoping that someone would convince me that my impression is wrong and maybe explain a little more so that I might understand this topic better.
Again I don’t think my point was that they were engaging in games wherein uncertainty is the primary currency. I was suggesting that some of the use of rhetoric (and apologies for implying they were games) can give the impression that we are less certain of some areas of science than we maybe are.
But we don’t “reduce” reality by representing it I think. Reality exists outwith our representations. That seems to me to be an utterly fundamental point. Obviously we have to use representation to communicate knowledge about reality. In art we attempt to express the subjective emotional element in our representations and hope (or maybe don’t care) that the recipient engages empathetically. In science we try to ensure that our descriptions/representations provide an operational usefulness to others so that our descriptions represent the fundamental elements of the particular reality under scrutiny in the particular context of our investigation.
Ah, I think this is actually what I was trying to say, rather badly it seems. Long day!
It is not self-evident that science describes the more fundamental elements of reality. It describes things that can be observed within existing cognitive frameworks of reference (widely accepted theories, models), often with a view to manipulating the elements under investigation (controlled experiments as the gold standard).
Art is concerned about our being in the world (a very specific reality, too), often in a contemplative way. This is no less fundamental.
There are striking similarities, too. Just think of the importance of imageries in both areas, and the need to be socially accepted with novel approaches (peers, gatekeepers, the public).
I get the impression that you (Reiner) are simply going to ignore anything I ask you and you may well be perfectly justified in doing so (and, of course, have every right to do so). It might be nice – however – if you would, for example, explain the sentence that I’ve quoted above. For Greg’s benefit, though, this is the type of statement I’m referring to. A statement that gives the impression that there is some doubt about what science is trying to – or can – do. Of course, it is possible that I don’t understand what Reiner means. I may just not be bright enough to get it. I get the impression – however – that there others with similar backgrounds and levels of experience to me, who also fail to get this. So maybe it’s just us, or maybe not.
Of course, I should add, that it could be that you’re right. That science can’t explain some fundamental elements of reality. My point would be, however, that scientists assume that the reality they observe is an actual reality and that the equations/models that they are using are describing this reality. There may be another reality that science can’t describe, but I fail to see the logic in implying this when engaging in discussions that appear to relate to the science/policy interface.
I think you misunderstood. From what you wrote I got the impression that you think science addresses *more* fundamental elements of reality, compared to other forms of representation. Correct me if I am wrong.
No, I think sciences addresses a reality. I would argue that it addresses the reality that we perceive. We live on a ball of rock, orbiting a ball of plasma with fusion its core, that exists in a galaxy with a supermassive black hole at its center, that is in a universe that formed in what we call a Big Bang 13.8 billion years ago. The laws of nature (or laws physics) can be used to describe and to understand this reality. That’s my view, at least. If someone can convince me otherwise, feel free to do so.
As I said at the end of my comment, there may well be some other fundamental reality that science can’t address. My point would be that in discussing this other kind of fundamental reality, that we should be careful of making it seem that we’re implying that there is some uncertainty about science’s ability to describe the reality that it is trying to describe (the reailty that we can measure and observe). Again, maybe I misunderstand what’s being said, but – if I am – that itself may illustrate a potential issue (or, I’m just unable to understand).
You’ve responded to an interpretation of your own devising Reiner. It’s not my interpretation. As your blockquote of my post indicates I said “our descriptions represent the fundamental elements of the particular reality”. Obviously our scientific descriptions don’t necessarily encompass the entirety of reality.
An example: Consider the scientific descriptions of the atomic resolution structure of a protein that we might use for drug design, understanding evolutionary relationships etc. The fundamental element of the reality of the protein for these purposes with respect to its structure are the spatial coordinates of the atoms, the bonds between the atoms, the charge distribution etc all of which can be determined objectively as we agreed on the previous thread, yes?
But that’s not the entire reality of a protein. In our description of the reality of the protein structure for these purposes we don’t need to describe the substructures of the nuclei that make up the protein nor describe the nature of nuclear and electronic spin states, nor the time evolution of the fluctuations at room or body temperature and so on. Of course we might have scientific representations of these further realities that may be useful for other purposes.
Note that one certainly doesn’t need to be “socially accepted” in science (nor in art)! One needs only that the interpretations made about a particular reality under investigation are consistent with the evidence presented.
Note also that scientific knowledge and artistic experiential representation are broadly separate ways of knowing/representing reality even if one can use semantic descriptions in a pretence of drawing them together. Couldn’t agree more that artistic representation may provide a deeply meaningful insight into human experience…but this is rather different to scientific knowledge.
Chris, ATTP
I am glad that the misunderstanding has been cleared up and you agree that there are other forms of representation (apart from science) which are fundamental to human understanding of the world.
I am less convinced that some of the examples and comments are germane to your argument. Let me pick two: the assertion about black holes and the bugbear of ‘the social’ (again, I’m afraid).
The black hole example poses the question if this is solid fact or theoretical conjecture. I quote from Wiki: “Astrophysicists searching for black holes thus have to rely on indirect observations. A black hole’s existence can sometimes be inferred by observing its gravitational interactions with its surroundings. A project run by MIT’s Haystack Observatory is attempting to observe the event horizon of a black hole directly. Initial results are encouraging.”
This sounds like a rather weak statement and it is my guess that social scientists making similar statements they would get a lot of flak. Isn’t it the case that a group of astrophysicists has convinced themselves (with good reasons!), and others, that there are things called black holes albeit we do not have direct empirical evidence of their existence? That the very nature of the (hypothesised) object makes it impossible to observe it directly?
The other example is about the social acceptance of knowledge claims:
I have two issues with this:
An interpretation being consistent with the evidence does not mean that you have established a fact, or that this will be even noticed by others. More likely you are maverick and be treated like one.
‘Being consistent with’ is a really weak form of construing a link between evidence and interpretation (or between theory and evidence, for that matter). Many things can be ‘consistent with’. Scientific explanations are usually more specific, I would have thought. As soon as you think about degrees of proof, such notions as plausibility and consistence come into play, which are not universally defined. They are social conventions, just to repeat a point important to make time and again.
Maybe another instance of misunderstanding?
I’m not quite sure why you think the confusion been cleared up. My point would be still that the existence of these others forms of representation do not imply that science is unable to describe the world/universe that it is trying to describe.
In my opinion your assessment of the existence – or not – of black holes is another illustration of my issue. You seem to think that we must directly observe something in some tangible way in order to be convinced of its existence. Take the supermassive black hole at the centre of our galaxy. There are stars in orbit around this black hole that allow us to determine the mass enclosed within these orbits. It turns out to be around 4 million times the mass of the Sun. These stars also come as close to this unseen object as Neptune is to the Sun. So, we have an object that is smaller in size than our own Solar System but has a mass 4 million times that of the Sun and that does not emit any radiation. That’s already fairly convincing evidence for something like a black hole, but not quite enough. We also have some observations of x-rays coming from the very inner parts of this region, that would imply that the object is actually smaller than the distance from the Sun to the Earth. So an object with a radius less than the distance to the Sun to the Earth and 4 million times the mass of the Sun. What could that be. Well the only object that it could be that we know of is a black hole. Now there may well be some other kind of object made out of some kind of matter that we have yet to discover that behaves in a way that we have yet to understand, but the evidence all points towards a supermassive black hole at the centre of our galaxy. Furthermore, there is much more I could add that would make this evidence even stronger. So, just because it might be something we have no evidence for, made of matter we have yet to discover, that behaves in a way that we have yet to encounter is not particularly good reason to suggest that it might not be a black hole.
So, in my opinion, you’ve just done essentially what I’ve been suggested. You’ve sown doubt about something without any real attempt to actually understand the evidence or without any attempt to find out from experts their view of the strength of the evidence. The final part of your comment is – in my opinion – essentially playing the kind of rhetorical games that I’m suggesting. Sowing doubt because we can’t know something with absolute certainty. Trying to discuss whether something is a fact or not. These are all fine and interesting questions for someone interested in the philosophy of science. However, coming from someone who – as I understand it – regards themselves as being at the science/policy interface, they simply add more uncertainty than is actually justified and I have yet to be convinced that this is a reasonable way to represent scientific evidence and what it can tell us about the world in which we live.
That’s a somewhat slippery statement! I used “fundamental” in a specific manner in my posts so that it relates to the elements of reality appropriate to the particular scientific investigation. So for the objectively determined elements of a protein structure that are fundamental to drug design, we require the atomic resolution spatial coordinates, bonds and charge distribution. As I pointed out other elements of reality (e.g. the nuclear and electronic spin states) are not fundamental to this problem.
You’ve used a semantic argument to change my very specific meaning of “fundamental” with respect to science to encompass the entirety of human experience. It might be helpful if you were to define or indicate the meaning of “fundamental” in your text. “Fundamental” is obviously a rather malleable word and it would be silly to generate a confusion by using the word in a different ways in our respective posts! In any case note that no one is arguing that artistic representation doesn’t provide insight into/knowledge of, the personal and emotional aspects of the human experience. However this knowledge is broadly different from that of scientific knowledge (I suggested why in my post above).
Again you’re rather changing the meaning of my post! You were suggesting a similarity between art and science in the (untrue I think) “requirement” for being “socially accepted”. So my response that social acceptance isn’t required in science (or art) refers to what you were referring to (science and art). You are now shifting the meaning to relate to scientific facts.
It’s easy to clear up your misunderstanding here. Let’s say I write a paper with an interpretation of an experiment. For this to be valid science (pass peer review, be published, be considered as a reliable piece of work by other scientists) it is sufficient that the interpretations are consistent with the observations (no social acceptance required!). Obviously it doesn’t mean I’ve established a fact. My interpretation might not be true after all.
Facts are established when the evidence in support of an interpretation (or hypothesis) become rather firm, usually as a result of the implications of the interpretations/hypothesis being realized in a body of further studies.
As we are talking about ‘ways of knowing’ I just wanted to throw this little log on the fire – an interesting way of dealing with this topic…..I was surprised to see it in the US curriculum:
http://www.arkscience.org/science_and_scientific_theory.php#waysofknowing
This is a non-sequitur. You are setting up a strawman. Get real!
Perhaps you are someone with credentials in the area of astrophysics (difficult to know as you prefer to blog anonymously), and you have chosen the example of black holes, raising the question if they are real. You may not be aware of it but you are opening a can of worms, leading to issues which pertain to science studies, including philosophy and sociology of science. However, you do not like to engage with the expertise in this area, taking the stance of someone who knows better. Who is playing rhetorical games?
I’m not trying to set up a strawman and fail to see why you think so. Whether you like it or not, from what I’ve seen there is rhetoric being used that appears to suggest that there is more uncertainty associated with science than may be justified. You can take that information and do with it as you wish. Telling me to “get real”, however, is extremely unlikely to convince me that my impression is unjustified. Maybe ask yourself why you seem rather irritated with what I’ve said and why you’ve chosen to respond as you have.
No, that is incorrect. I’m not trying to suggest that there aren’t interesting issues in sociology and the philosophy of science and I’m certainly more than happy to acknowledge that my understanding of the details of the sociology of science is poor. That, however, is – in my opinion – not the point. Bear in mind that I’m not trying to study the sociology of science. I’m trying to establish if those who study science actually understand – or are able to understand – the strength of the scientific evidence. Remember, I didn’t wiki something about sociology and argue that it sounded like sociologists were less certain than had been implied.
Let me try to make my case one more time. As I understand it, the discussion here is specifically about Science and Technology Studies, not the sociology/philosophy of science. STS reseachers – unless you can convince me otherwise – are those who see themselves as sitting at the science/policy and science/society interface. Consequently, it’s my opinion that such people should aim to have a good understanding of how science works, what it can do and some idea of the strength of the scientific evidence. They should also understand something of how scientific evidence can be used by society and by policy makers. Hence I don’t see the value in presenting arguments that appear to relate to philosophical questions as to the meaning of reality and whether or not anyone can know anything objectively. These may be interesting philosophical questions but I cannot see how they would help policy makers to decide if some piece of scientific evidence is strong enough to use as input to a policy decision.
I thought I might add a comment relating to this. I actually thought I was, otherwise why would I be commenting here. I was rather hoping that they might engage with me.
If that is the impression I’m giving, then I apologise. I would certainly appreciate someone putting some effort into convincing me that my impression is wrong or – if not wrong – that my concerns are unjustified. Criticising me for what I say, rather than criticising what I’m saying, seems a rather pointless strategy.
I’ve responded to your Reiner Grundmann June 23, 2014 at 10:58 am, Reiner
but it seems to have been embedded (twice) below “AndTheThere’sPhysics” post:
And Then There’s Physics June 23, 2014 at 12:39 pm
haven’t quite got the hang of the “Reply” function I think. Administrator might want to delete one of my duplicates 🙂
Done!
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